Montana Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 1 Spring 1951

Article 5

January 1951

Validity of Deed Given under Compulsion of "Foreign" Court
Gene A. Picotte

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Gene A. Picotte, Validity of Deed Given under Compulsion of "Foreign" Court, 12 Mont. L. Rev. (1951).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol12/iss1/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Picotte: Validity of Deed Given under Compulsion of "Foreign" Court
NOTE AND COMMENT
man; John C. Hauck of Helena, Secretary; and E. A. Blenkner
of Columbus, W. E. Keely of Deer Lodge, Joseph J. McCaffery
Jr. of Butte, Theodore F. McFadden of Dillon, and Honorable
R. S. McHugh of Anaconda, administrative personnel.
The Honorable Cody Fowler, President of the American
Bar Association, will appear as a guest speaker at the 1951
meeting to be held in Butte on June 28, 29, and 30, 1951.
VALIDITY OF DEED GIVEN UNDER COMPULSION
OF "FOREIGN" COURT
A court of equity of one jurisdiction cannot directly affect
by its decree title to land situated in another state. A court
foreign to the situs of land is said to have "... . no inherent power, by the mere force of its decree, to annul a deed or to establish a title."' However, it is well settled that jurisdiction exists
in a court of equity to give a decree directing a defendant over
whom it has personal jurisdiction to execute a conveyance of
land situated elsewhere, and that such a decree may be enforced,
as against the person of the defendant, by contempt proceedings!
Courts of the situs have consistently recognized such defendant-executed deeds as valid.' Inevitably, however, astute
counsel will someday persuade a situs court to refuse recognition to one of these conveyances,' and the situs' decision will be
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. There are
'Hart v. Sansom (1894) 110 U.S. 151, 155. This particular quotation
has been repeated in many cases.
'Penn v. Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 2 White and T. Lead. Cas. in
Eq. 923; Montgomery v. U.S. (1888) 36 F. 4; Cleveland v. Burrill
(1857) 25 Barb. 532; Hart v. Sansom (1894) 110 U.S. 151, 155; Watkins v. Holman 16 Pet. 25 (U.S. 1842) ; Corbett v. Nutt 10 Wall. 464
(U.S. 1868) ; Carpenter v. Strange (1891) 141 U.S. 87; Tardy v. Morgan (1844) 3 McLean 358, Fed. Cas. No. 13 752; Burnley v. Stevenson
(1873) 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621; Davis v. Headley (1871) 22
N. J. Eq. 115.
8
Bullock v. Bullock (1894) 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 A. 676, 46 Am. St. Rep.
528, 27 L.R.A. 213; Mitchell v. Bunch (1831) 2 Paige 606, 22 Am. Dec.
669; Baschal v. Acklin (1863) 27 Tex. 174; Burnley v. Stevenson
(1873) 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621; Steele v. Bryant (1909) 132
Ky. 569, 116 S. W. 765; Deschenes v. Tallman (1928) 248 N.Y. 33, 161
N.E. 321; Bailey v. Tully (1943) 242 Wis. 226, 7 N.W. (2d) 837, 145
A.L.R. 578.
"AnIowa case very nearly raises this issue: Gilliland v. Inabnit (1894),
92 Iowa 46, 60 N.W. 211. However, there the original grantor never
did contest the conveyance. After his death some of his heirs sought
unsuccessfully to have the grant set aside. Cf. Goodrich's interpretation of this case: GOODRIcH, CONFLCT or LAws (3d. Ed. 1949) 219, n.
205.
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a variety of reasons which the situs might assign for its refusal.'
Whether the jurisdiction of the foreign court will give the deed
efficacy at the situs in the face of the situs' displeasure, and
whether the Supreme Court will require the situs to give effect
to the coerced deed under the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
the precise question to which this comment is addressed. The
decision of the Supreme Court on the subject will be a landmark in the law because it will precisely define, at last, the
power or jurisdiction which a court of equity may exercise over
land outside its own territory.
The general question of the extraterritorial power of a court
equity
with respect to land has been a subject of extensive
of
inquiry by many legal writers.' T~he theories advanced have included all possibilities, ranging from the view that the situs may
utterly ignore whatever the foreign court tries to do,' to the
view that the action of the foreign court should be accorded Full
Faith and Credit at the situs.' For the most part, these writers
have considered the problem as one of defining the scope of
'For example, suppose that the foreign court orders a minor to convey land at the situs, and by the law of the situs the minor cannot convey land; or suppose that the foreign suit is for specific performance of
a contract entered into in the foreign jurisdiction to convey land at the
situs, and the contract would be void at the situs, while good by the
law of the foreign jurisdiction; or suppose the situs court declared the
deed invalid simply because executed under the coercion of the foreign
court.
6See Langdell, SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING, 35, n. 4 (1883) ; Note, 25
HARv. L. REv. 653 (1912) ; Note 21 HARv. L. RPv. 210 (1908) ; Walsh,
EQUITY § 17 (1930), (cf. review of Chaffee, 44 HARV. L. REV. 313, 316

(1930) ; Schofield, Equity JurisdictionUnder the Full Faith and Credit
(lause; Fall v. Eastin, 5 ILL L. REV. 1 (1910) (uncompleted) ; Pound,
Progress of the Law-Equity, 33 H~av. L. REv. 420, 423, 425 (1920);

Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property, 20 HARV. L. REv. 382
(1907) ; Schofield, Full Faith and Credit v. Comity and Local Rules of
Jurisdiction,10 ILL. L. REv. 11, 28-30 (1915) ; Cook, Powers of Courts of
Equity, 15 COL. L. REv. 106, 159 n. 56, 228, 243-246; 2 BLAcx, JunoMENTS, 2nd Edition, § 872 (1902) ; Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith

and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees for Conveyance of Foreign
Land, 34 YAZ L. J. 591 (1925) ; Barbour, The EaxtraterritorialEffect
of Equitable Decrees, 17 MICH. L. REv. 527 (1919) ; Durfee, Note 18,
MicH. L. REv. 142 (1919) ; Goodrich, Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree, 5 IA. L. BULL, 230 (1920) ; Goodrich, CoNFLicTs OF LAWS,

§ 207 (1927) ; Messner, The Jurisdictionof a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doing of Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of
the State, 14 MINN. L. REv. 494 (1930) ; note, 70 CENT. L. J. 1 (1910) ;
Note, 11 CAN. BAR Rnv. 211; Gordon, The Converse of Penn v. Balti-

more, 49 L. Q. REv. 547 (1933); Developments in the Law, Equity, 47

H~Av. L. Rnv. 1174, n 2 (1934); Briggs, The Jurisdictional--Choice-ofLaw Relation in Conflicts Rules, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1179 (1948).
This list is far from exhaustive.

'Briggs, op. cit. 6; Schofield, Full Faith and Credit v. Comity and Local
Rules of Jurisdiction, 10 ILL. L. REv. 11, 28-30 (1915).
'Barbour, op. cit. 6; Durfee, op. cit. 6; Messner, opt. cit. 6.
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equity jurisdiction, i.e., merely as a problem of laying down a
rule pronouncing what a court of equity, as such, may do with
respect to foreign land. It is believed that such an analysis is
inadequate for finding a satisfactory solution.
More deeply considered, the problem is one of conflict of
laws. Any refusal on the situs' part to give effect to the foreign
decree, or to a conveyance executed in compliance with it, will
necessarily arise out of some law or policy which the situs has
with respect to its own land; or, put another way, out of a failure of the law of the foreign state to conform to the law of the
situs. Thus, the pertinent inquiry is this: When a court of
equity of one state attempts to affect title to land in another
state, and its power to do so is denied by courts of the situs
(necessarily on the basis of the situs' law) which court has power
to apply its own law to the exclusion of the law of the other?
The rule laid down for resolving this conflict will be a rule
which recognizes a paramount power in one court or the other
to apply its own law in determining the party in whom title will
finally reside. That will be its net effect, by whatever name it
is called and in whatever words it is expressed. Such rule will
hereinafter be called a rule of controlling jurisdiction or powerrecognizing rule.
A search of the cases for such a power-recognizing rule is
soon rewarded. The repository of exclusive jurisdiction is unquestionably the situs. The decisions of the Supreme Court
around the point are replete with statements like the following
from DeVaughn v. Hutchison:'
"It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the
state where land is situated we must look for the rules
which govern its descent, alienation and transfer, and for
and construction of wills and other conveythe effect
0
anes.''
This language indicates that the power of the situs in this
regard goes beyond the determination of the mere formal sufficiency of the act of conveyance. Its law is determinative of
all questions relative to passage of title to land within its borders.' A clearer statement of a power-recognizing rule would
be difficult to imagine.
-(1896) 165 U.S. 566.
"Id., p. 568.

'See Clarke v. Clarke (1900) 178 U.S. 186, holding that a court of the
situs not only has the power to decide the validity of a conveyance of
land within its territorial jurisdiction, but also has power to determine
whether power existed in the conveying party to make the conveyance
in the first place.
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If the Supreme Court can be taken to mean what it says
about the exclusive application of the situs' rule, then without
doubt no dispute relating to passage of title can be finally settled without either the application of the situs' law, as such, or
the consent of the situs to the contravention of its law. A power
in the foreign court to give a decree of conveyance, and enforce
it hgainst the person of a defendant within its personal jurisdiction, is not inconsistent with the exclusive power of the situs,

so long as we keep in mind that the foreign court in giving its
decree must depend upon the situs to make it finally effective.
If the foreign court in framing its decree adheres carefully to
the formal and substantive requirements of the situs' law, it
will, of course, have the greatest assurance that the situs will
give effect to the decree or a conveyance executed thereunder.
If the foreign court applies its own or some other law not coinciding with the internal or conflicts law of the situs, then it will
have to depend on whatever policy of comity the situs may have
at the choice-of-law level. In any event, the situs, applying its
own exclusively applicable law or policy, will decide what operation the foreign action will have on the land. This sufficiently
explains the cases where foreign decrees and conveyances executed thereunder have been recognized as valid by the situs.'
It appears, then, that the rule which will give or deny
actual, final effectiveness to the foreign decree, or a conveyance
pursuant thereto, is a choice-of-law rule belonging to the situs
and exclusively applicable because of the recognized exclusive
power or jurisdiction of the situs over its own land.
Actually, there are two rules here in operation: 1. An exclusively applicable choice-of-law rule belonging to the situs, and
2. A rule belonging to the foreign jurisdiction which recognized
the exclusive character of the situs' choice of law rule. To repeat, this latter is a power-recognizing rule, itself a conflicts
rule. It obliges any foreign court to look to the whole law of
the situs when determining rights in land.'
"See note 3, Supra. In 1 CHAFEE AND SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY (1934)
143, the authors declare that at least seven different theories have
been advanced as to the "effect of foreign decrees for the conveyance
of land," briefly describing each. It is believed that the thesis of this
paper will be helpful in harmonizing a large part of the apparently
diverse views set forth there.
"The recent English decision, Re Duke of Wellington (1947) Ch. 506;
(1948) Ch. 118 has stirred up a discussion among certain English
scholars of the question whose law governs when an English court adjudicates title to foreign land, and of the renvoi problem. See J. H. C.
Morris, Renvoi, 64 L. Q. Rav. 264 (1948) ; Jennings, note, 64 L. Q. REV.
321 (1948) ; Mann, note, 11 MoD. L. REv. 232 (1948) ; see also Falconbridge, note, 26 CAN. BAB Rav. 467 (1948). It is submitted that those
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The existence and actual use of such a separate category of
jurisdictional rules in the conflicts field is a rather new thesis,
formally advanced only recently by Professor Briggs of Montana
State University School of Law." This thesis should soon receive wide acceptance, at least as concerns interests in lands and
succession to movables," for only in the light of it do the cases
assume any consistency whatever. Any other analysis is inadequate in that the power of a foreign court of equity over the
person of a defendant before it is simply left at loggerheads with
the exclusive power of the situs over its land. Professor Briggs'
jurisdictional-choice-of-law dichotomy of conflicts rules breaks
the apparent deadlock between these two powers without doing
violence to either. It is believed that his thesis articulates the
law as it actually exists with regard to tangible movables and
land.
The great jurist, Judge Learned Hand, is in accord with
the views above expressed, as he indicates in the case of Irving
Trust Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.' There the trustee of a
criticizing this decision have missed the whole point. The central question in the Wellington case was whether English law or Spanish law
governed devolution of title to Spanish land owned by a British
national and domiciliary. The court began its ratio decidendi by
applying the well-settled rule that the law of the situs governs
succession to land. The court and the scholars accepted this rule
without objection and without examination. Their mistake was
made at this point. They assume that the rule is a choice-oflaw rule of the forum, which, seemingly, is based upon no stronger necessity then the convenience of the formum. Then, finding
that the Spanish conflicts (choice-of-law) rule would refer a Spanish
court, under the facts, to the law of England, they are caught in the
sticky renvoi web. The way out is to re-examine the basis of the lex
rel sitae rule. That rule is no mere matter of convenience, nor is It
a choice-of-law rule. If convenience were the only consideration, it
would be much more desirable simply to apply the internal law of
England, but, in fact, the English court has no freedom to pick and
choose in this matter, for only Spain can finally determine what may
be done with Spanish land. The lex rel sitae rule has Its basis in the
exclusive power of the Spanish Government, which is to say the exclusive jurisdiction of Spanish courts, over Spanish land. True, the
English court itself seems not to realize why it looks to the law of
Spain, but the answer to that must be that the court has applied the
rule while losing sight of the reason for It. In the light of this analysis,
renvoi Is exposed as a false problem, at least in the land field.
"See Briggs, The Dual Relationship of the Rules of Conflict of Laws in
the Succession Field, 15 Miss. L. J.77 (1943) ; Briggs, op. cit. 6.
5
8See Briggs, The Dual Relationship of the Rules of Conflict of Laws in
the Succession Field,15 Miss. L. J. 77 (1943).
-(1936) 83 F. (2d) 168, 111 A.L.R. 1165. Cf. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF

LAws (3d. Ed. 1949) 466-67, nn. 50 and 51.
proposition that,

"...

He cites this case for the

The acceptance of title being a tort, 'any court,'

said Judge Learned Hand, 'may compel the tortfeasor specifically to
restore the property, whatever the law of this situs'." Out of context,
it is submitted that this is an extremely misleading quotation. Hand
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bankrupt corporation filed a bill in equity to have set aside
conveyances made by the bankrupt to the defendant prior to
bankruptcy. The conveyances were executed pursuant to a contract made in New York, and the land was situated in Missouri,
Florida and New Jersey. nhe plaintiff alleged that the conveyances were illegal under Section 114 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law, which provided that property transfers made
by a corporation doing business in New York were unlawful
if, at the time of transfer, the corporation was insolvent or
threatened with insolvency. Judge Hand held that since the law
of the situs "determines absolutely the validity of conveyances,
wherever made, "" the New York court could not adjudge void
conveyances executed in New York, "except as the lex rei sitae
is the same as Section 114 [of the New York statute]."' However, he stated that acceptance of the deeds by the defendant was
a wrong to the creditors of the bankrupt for which the defendant would be liable in a suit for damages because of the wellsettled doctrine that the law of the place of contracting is controlling in litigation respecting contracts for the sale of land.
He then said:
"True, the same doctrine might not apply to the remedy
of specific restitution, or specific performance; Englishspeaking courts have always been sensitive about land,
and in recent years the doctrine of lex rei sitae has been
extended to chattels. Yet in principle there ought to be
no distinction between the remedies, for, as we have said,
one would invade as little as the other the sovereignty of
the situs, which would be free to refuse any effect to the
enforced conveyance, if it chose. The result of such a refusal upon a suit elsewhere might indeed be crucial, but
only because, seeing that its remedy would be futile if
granted, the court might decline to act at all. When, as
here, there is no reason to suspect that the lex rei sitae
would not recognize such conveyances as valid though
made under the duress of a decree, there is no reason to
hesitate." (Italics supplied) '
He concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of
himself, makes It perfectly clear that a foreign court may compel a
tortfeasor specifically to restore property only because the situs presumably acquiesces in that procedure. Elsewhere Goodrich expressly
recognizes that such foreign executed deed is good only

". .. if,

at the

situs of the land, a deed executed elsewhere will be recognized as ef" Id. at 217.
fective ..
171.
"Id.,
8
' Id., 172.

19Selover, Bates and Co. v. Walsh (1912) 226 U.S. 112; in re Barrett
(1926) 12 F. (2d) 73, 77, 78.

20Op. cit. 16, p. 172.
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recoveyance of all the land illegally transferred, and that the
New York court had power to give such a decree, for the very
reason that the power of the situs to refuse any effect to any conveyance made pursuant to the decree remained unimpaired. The
Supreme Court of the United States refused certiorari.'
As stated above, the precise question of the extraterritorial
efficacy of a coerced deed in the presence of the situs' refusal
to recognize it has never been directly decided by the Supreme
Court. However, it is believed that the power of the situs to refuse all effect to such a deed is impliedly affirmed in the case of
Clarke v. Clarke.' In that case the plaintiff brought an action
in a Connecticut state court on a decree of the Supreme Court
of South Carolina which declared that, under the law of South
Carolina, land situated in Connecticut became personalty when
devised by the will of the South Carolina resident. Such a conversion, if finally effective, would have resulted in certain advantages to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Connecticut
decided that under the law of Connecticut the land remained
realty, that the law of Connecticut governed the matter, and refused to give any effect to the South Carolina decision. The
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Connecticut
decision, saying:
"It is conceded that, had the will been presented to the
courts of Connecticut in the first instance, and the rights
been asserted under it, the operative force of its provisions
on the real estate in Connecticut would have been within
the control of such courts. But it is said a different rule
must be applied where the will has been presented to a
South Carolina court and a construction has been there
given it; for in such a case not the will, but the decree of
the South Carolina court construing the will, is the measure of the rights of the parties, as to the real estate in
Connecticut. The proposition, when truly comprehended,
amounts but to the contention that the laws of the respective states controlling the transmission of real property
by will, or in the case of intestacy, are operative only so
long as there does not exist in a foreign jurisdiction a
judgment or decree which in legal effect has changed the
law of the situs of the real estate. This is but to contend
that what cannot be accomplished directly can be accomplished by indirection, and that the fundamental principle
which gives to a sovereignty exclusive jurisdiction over
land within its borders is in legal effect dependent upon
'(1912) 299 U.S. 571. Whether approval of the doctrine here pertinent
is implicit in the denial is not clear.
(1900) 178 U.S. 186.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1951

7

Montana Law Review, Vol. 12 [1951], Iss. 1, Art. 5
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the non-existence of a decree of a court of another sovereignty determining the status of such land. Manifestly,
however, a power cannot be said to be exclusive, or even to
exist at all, where its exercise may be thus frustrated at
any time." (Italics supplied).'
With regard to the Full Faith and Credit Clause the Court said:
".. . no violation [of full faith and credit] was brought
about, as the decree of the South Carolina Court was not
entitled to be followed by the courts of Connecticut, by
reason of a lack of jurisdiction in the South Carolina
Court over the particular subject matter ..
" (Italics
supplied) .
In the context of the quotations the Court indulges in no language indicating an intention to restrict the principle of the
exclusiveness of the situs' power to the particular facts of the
case, or to restrict it in any way. Certainly, a decree of the
South Carolina court commanding conveyance by a defendant
of the Connecticut land would be no less an attempt to infringe
on the exclusive power of the situs as conceived by the Court.
Such a decree would be just as much an attempt to accomplish
by indirection that which cannot be accomplished directly, and,
if accorded full faith and credit, would just as effectively "frustrate at any time" the exercise of the situs' exclusive jurisdiction over its land.'
There remains for consideration probably the most famous
of all cases considering this problem. In Fall v. Eastin' the
majority opinion unqualifiedly supports our above conclusions.
There P, H's divorced wife, sought to recover certain Nebraska
land from D. To support her action she asked Nebraska to give
full faith and credit to a property settlement found in the divorce decree granted her by the state of Washington, and ordering H to transfer title of the Nebraska land to P. Instead, H
rushed to Nebraska and transferred to D, who had full notice.
The Washington court then directed its commissioner to give her
-IO., pp. 191, 192.
'I.,

p. 195.

r'At this point it is appropriate to again state that the fact that deeds
of the type here in question have generally been honored by the situs
constitutes no valid objection to the position we have taken in this
comment. It must always be kept in mind that the question whether
the situs will give effect to a deed is quite distinct from the question
whether the situs must give effect to it The cases where the situs has
honored these deeds (note 3, supra) are properly described as illustrations of the operation of the situs' own choice-of-law rule.
-(1909) 215 U.S. 1.
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a deed, which she also relied on. The majority ruled that Nebraska was under no such compulsion, and it seems reasonably
clear that their opinion was not based on the fact that the suit
was not formally between H and W.
Although the majority opinion is clear enough, Holmes" ' special concurring opinion probably has caused the greatest interest
and has produced the confusion existing as to just what this
case stands for. It is typical of the confused treatment generally accorded this question by judges. Holmes believes that, because the Washington court had jurisdiction of H and W, its
decree was "entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska. "'
Assuming at the outset that the answer is obvious, in view of
this admitted jurisdiction, it is apparent that Holmes does not
consider the real issue in the case at any point. That basic question is as to the possible limitations upon Washington's power
to render an effective decree, and the limitations upon the effectiveness of any decree thus rendered, because of the fact that
the real subject matter is foreign land. That he never recognizes
this as the element making the case particularly difficult is evidenced by the fact that he cites Fauntleroy v. Lum,' decided by
himself just one year earlier, and dealing with the entirely different subject matter of the effect of F-l's judgment in F-2,
based exclusively on simple contract rights.
Further, he assumes that the effect of the Washington decree is to be determined just like any judgment based on simple
contract rights. He tells us that, "If the husband had made a
contract, valid by the law of Washington, to do the same thing,
I think there is no doubt that the contract would have been binding in Nebraska. ' '
Failing to check carefully his certainty
that such contract would be valid in Nebraska, it does not seem
to occur to him to ask whether it is valid only because and to the
extent that Nebraska law makes it valid, or because it is valid
in Washington. So it becomes clear that Holmes begs the only
real question in the case from the very first of his opinion. He
adds that "So I conceive that a Washington decree for the
"Cf. Goodrich, Two States an Rea Estate, 89 U. PA. LAw REv. 417, 428
n. 50 (1941). It is submitted that Goodrich concedes too much to Holmes'
analysis. Under the thesis of this paper, it is the majority opinion
that is perfectly clear in its import. Goodrich also assumes too much
in so far as he intends to say that the bald fact of exclusive control
over land need no longer be given decisive consideration in determining the locus of ultimate legislative jurisdiction with respect to "transactions which have land as their subject matter." Id. at 419 n. 12.
21M., p. 15.

(1908) 210 U.S. 230.
3'Op. oit. 26, p. 14.
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specific performance of such a contract would be entitled to full
faith and credit as between the parties in Nebraska.' ' Again,
he fails to consider carefully the question whether such judgment would be entitled to full faith and credit only on the assumption that it conforms strictly to Nebraska law entitling one
to specific pefromance, or because it conforms with Washington
law. Can Washington render a decree for specific performance
entitled to full faith and credit, altogether contrary to the law
of Nebraska determining when a contract is entitled to specific
performance ?' There is no evidence that it can.
Holmes concludes his consideration of the status of the
Washington decree in Nebraska with these observations: "A
personal decree is equally within the jurisdiction of a court having a person within its power, whatever its ground and whatever it orders the defendant to do. Tlherefore I think that this
decree is entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska."' Having begun his discussion with a question-begging statement, he
finishes it with a question-begging conclusion. Presumably,
Holmes here states his view that, as between H and P, P should
be able to compel the Nebraska court to compel H to convey title
to her because Washington has so ordered it, having had jurisdiction to make such order. But that is a non sequitur. Authority for any such proposition is again entirely lacking. Granted
even that the Washington decree is "entitled to full faith and
credit," exactly what faith and credit does this particular kind
of judgment demand? Equitable orders are supposed to be
strictly personal and purely local in scope. By their own terms
they are not supposed to have any extraterritorial effect.
If "full faith and credit" compels Nebraska to give effect
to the bare finding of the Washington court that P is entitled
to the Nebraska land, that is getting dangerously near to an
attempt to act in rem, and states a proposition expressly denied
by Carpenter v. Strange," and many other cases. Furthermore,
even if Nebraska were compelled to enforce the order to convey as between H and P, surely Holmes would not deny to Nebraska the exclusive power to determine the status of such
deed, once given. To deny it this power certainly would empower Washington to control the title to Nebraska landdirectly for all practical purposes. Having that power, it is
absurd to say that Nebraska is compelled to coerce the giving
"Id., p. 15.
2
Briggs, op. cit. 6 p. 1183.
"Op. cit. 26, p. 15.
"(1891) 141 U.S. 87.
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of a deed which it can immediately strike down if it wants to
because it was given under the coercion of a decree.
But Holmes bases his final concurrence with the majority
on the proposition that after all, the case raises no constitutional question, because, although Nebraska, according to him,
must give full faith and credit to the Washington decree, nevertheless it has an unrestricted power to determine who are
privies to the Washington judgment. So it can provide even
that a purchaser with notice of the prior equity arising from
the Washington judgment will take free from those equities.
But if this is only because Nebraska is the situs, it amounts to
a recognition of ultimately controlling power in the situs. If,
however, Holmes intends to say that any F-2 could do the same
thing if the question arose there, it is an extremely doubtful
proposition. As between F-i, with an admitted jurisdiction
over both the persons and the subject matter, and F-2 as just
any other state where enforcement is sought, ordinarily F-1'
(provided F-1 does not try to make persons privies that are
not subject to F-i's law) is entitled to have its law as to privies
accorded full faith and credit.' So it would seem that F-2's
power to inquire into the question of who are privies under
the F-1 judgment should be limited to an inquiry into whether
F-1 has exceeded its jurisdiction in this respect. And even as
to this question, the United States Supreme Court must assume the final prerogative of deciding both the question
whether F-i's law on judgments has been complied with, and
that of whether F-1 has tried to exceed its jurisdiction with
respect to privies. Hence, it is by no means clear why Holmes
assumes that Nebraska must be conceded unlimited power to
determine who are takers without notice, and thus not privies
to the F-1 judgment.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has adopted
a significant provision bearing on the problem in Rule 70 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule provides:
"If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance
of land . . . and the party fails to comply within the
§ 450, Comment a.
'Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. (1912) 225
U.S. 111, holding that a decree of a Federal circuit court sitting in
New York, dismissing a suit in personam brought against one of two
joint tort feasors, is not denied full faith and credit by the refusal of
the Massachusetts court to treat it as a bar to a suit in Massachusetts
against the other tort feasor-on the ground that who is a privy to
the New York judgment is a jurisdictional question which Massachusetts is at liberty to inquire into independently, subject to U. S.
Supreme Court approval. RFWATEmENT,CONFLICTS, § 450 Comment d.
aRESTATEMENT, CONFLCTS,
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time specified, the court may direct the act to be done
at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person
appointed by the court, and the act when so done has
like effect as if done by the party ....

If the real or per-

sonal property is within the district, the court in lieu of
directing a conveyance thereof may enter a judgment
divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others
and has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form
of law .

Although the last part of the rule seems to restrict the
power of the District Court to give a decree which in and of
itself transfers title to those cases where the land is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, the first part of the rule, empowering the court to give an appointive decree, is not limited in
terms to where the land is situated. Hence the rule seems capable
of a construction which would extend the operation of an appointive decree, and the deed executed thereunder, to land situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and make
such deed effective without the concurrence of the situs. While
no case involving the rule has decided the point, it is extremely
unlikely that it will receive such a construction.'
So to construe it would be to overthrow all of the leading cases on the
point, viz. Clarke v. Clarke,' Fall v. Eastin,'° Carpenter v.
Strange,' etc., which enunciate the exclusive jurisdiction of the
situs' courts and the exclusive applicability of the situs' law.
Further, if the effect of the last-mentioned cases is conceded
to be that attributed to them in this comment, Rule 83 of the
same Code seems definitely to restrict the operation of Rule 70
to property located within the state where the District Court
sits. Rule 83 provides:
"These Rules [including Rule 70] shall not be construed
to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the District Courts
of the United States ....
""
It seems equally clear that Rule 70 does not create any
distinct Federal power with regard to land. In American
"1 F.R.D. CXXXV.
The reasonableness of the suggestion that a deed executed by a person
appointed by the court (other than the person in whom title is actually vested) could have any more efficacy in any event than a mere
decree purporting in and of itself to convey title is extremely questionable. For a discussion of this point see note, 13 ROCKY MOUNTAIN
LAW Rzv. 140 (1940).
MOp. cit., Note 11.
'Op. oit., Note 26.
(1891) 141 U.S. 87.
1 F.R.D. CXLVIII.
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NOTE AND COMMVENT
Surety Co. v. Edwards and Bradford Lumber Co.," a case involving the Rule, the District Court said:
"Actions to challenge transfers of [property] brought in
Federal District Courts are governed as to substantive
law wholly by state law.""
In fact, the framers of the Rule limited their discussion
of it largely to the question whether a Federal District Court
could properly adjudicate title to state land at all." They decided that question in the affirmative. The framers did not
address themselves to the question of a federal District Court's
extraterritorial jurisdiction.'
CONCLUSION: On reason and authority, the Supreme
Court of the United States most probably would not compel a
court of the situs of land to give any effect whatever to a deed
of such land executed personally by a defendant in compliance
with a decree of a foreign court of equity.
GENE A. PICOTTE.
42(1944) 57 F. Supp. 18; See also Dan Cohen Realty Co. v. National
Savings and Trust Co. (1942) 125 F. (2d) 288.
"57 F. Supp. 24.
'Rules of Civil Procedure, Proceedings of the Institutes in July 1938, pp.
338, 341, 343, American Bar Association (1938).
'8The attitude of state courts as regards the jurisdiction of foreign Federal district courts over land has been emphatically to the effect that
such Federal courts have no power whatever to contravene the situs'
state law without the situs' consent. An outspoken example of this
attitude is the following from the opinion of Angstman, J. in Wilson v.
Thelen (1940) 110 Mont. 305, 311, 100 P. (2d) 923, 926; cert. denied 311
U.S. 651. "There would be merit in plaintiff's claim [that the Wyoming
Federal District court's decision regarding ownership of Montana land
was res judicata] if the Wyoming court had jurisdiction to litigate
title to land in Montana. But it is firmly established that an action to
determine title to or an interest in real estate is local, and that courts
of one state have no jurisdiction to litigate title to land in another
state . . . jurisdiction lacking, it cannot be conferred by consent....
The Wyoming court was without jurisdiction to determine title to real
estate in Montana as against anyone, whether he submitted to the jurisdiction over his person or not. While it is proper for parties to submit to the jurisdiction of the court so far as their persons are concerned, they cannot by consent give the court jurisdiction over real
property outside the state. In other words, had the Wyoming case
been one to compel the execution of a deed to property in Montana, a
judgment so directing would have been binding upon those who were
served and were before the court" Obviously such judgment would
not be binding on the Montana court.
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